

Modal Aspects of Cuzco Quechua Evidentiality

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Abstract: The evidential system of Cuzco Quechua has been traditionally classified as a three-term system with a DIRECT evidential *-mi/-n*, a REPORTED evidential *-si/-s* and a CONJECTURE evidential *-chá* (see Faller 2002). These three morphemes are described as indicating the source of information for a given proposition. Specifically the source of information can be the speaker's personal experience, the experience of others (i.e. not the speaker), and conclusion arrived at through the speaker's ability to reason, respectively. However when the event that is indicated in the respective evidentials is considered independently from the event ascribed to the proposition of the utterance, the evidential system can be inflated. Specifically when considered as an independent event, separate from the utterance, evidentials can be divided into two broad groups *realis* and *irrealis*, with a fourth suffix *-chus* 'BELIEF' being added to the paradigm. This paper explores the claim that a more accurate description of Quechua evidentiality is found in highlighting the interaction between evidentials and their modal interpretations.

1. Introduction¹

The goal of this paper is to describe the evidential morphology of the Apurimaq/Cotobamba dialect of Cuzco Quechua in relation to the notions of *realis* and *irrealis* moods. It is argued that each evidential used in Cuzco Quechua can have a peripheral mood interpretation that is essential to an accurate characterization of the entire system. These mood interpretations have largely been ignored in traditional accounts of evidentiality paradigms cross-linguistically, and specifically in Cuzco Quechua (see for example Aikhenvald 2004, Faller 2002, and Adelaar 1977). Except for the mood interpretations being argued for here, the Quechua evidentiality system has traditionally been described as a three-term system (see below). This paper claims, however, when the mood connotations of the evidentials are taken into account these traditional descriptions of the Quechua evidential system are incomplete and that the evidentiality paradigm might be increased to a four-term system.

¹ The abbreviations used in this paper are: CONJ (CONJECTURE), COND (CONDITIONAL), PROG (PROGRESSIVE), 3SG (THIRD PERSON SINGULAR), REP (REPORT), DIR (DIRECT EVIDENCE), DUB (DUBATIVE), IRR (IRREALIS), CERT (CERTAINTY), LOC (LOCATIVE), OBJ (OBJECT), 1SG.FUT (FIRST PERSON SINGULAR FUTURE), 3FUT (THIRD PERSON FUTURE), REFL (REFLEXIVE), GEN (GENITIVE), 1SG.POSS (FIRST PERSON SINGULAR POSSESSIVE), NEG (NEGATIVE), PST (PAST), PERF (PERFECTIVE), INF (INFINITIVE), PRES.NOM (PRESENT NOMINALIZATION), PST.NOM (PAST NOMINALIZATION), COM (COMITATIVE), and FOC (FOCUS).

The traditional classification of Quechua evidentials posits three members of the grammatical class of evidentials *-mi/-n*, *-si/-s*, and *-chá* exemplified by the example sentences in (1) (see Faller 2002 and Aikhenvald 2004). The first example sentence, (1a), is included to show the optionality of the use of evidentials, and it is considered to have the same source of information as (1b), which uses the *-mi* evidential.

(1) Traditional Quechua Evidential System

a. *para-sha-n*

rain-PROG-3SG

‘It is raining’

Speaker does not mark information source.

b. *para-sha-n-mi*

rain-PROG-3SG-DIR

‘It is raining’

Speaker has seen it raining or has other direct evidence that it is raining.

c. *para-sha-n-si*

rain-PROG-3SG-REPORT

‘It is raining (reportedly)’

Speaker has received information from someone else that it is raining.

d. *para-sha-n-chá*

rain-PROG-3SG-CONJ

‘It is raining (most likely)’

Speaker uses past experience applied to a non-experienced situation.

As will be seen throughout this paper, besides indicating the source of information, these evidentials also have meanings that indicate the reality of that source of information. When described from this perspective, the evidential paradigm can be reclassified as a four-term system (see Aikhenvald 2004 for a typological discussion of the four-term evidentiality systems) instead of this three-term system. This proposed description based on the reality meaning of the evidentials makes use of the three traditionally agreed on evidentials given above in (1) and adds a fourth suffix *-chus* ‘BELIEF’. This fourth member is exemplified in example (2).

(2) Belief evidential in Quechua Evidentials

a. *para-sha-n-chus* *hina*

rain-PROG-3SG-BELIEF seems

‘It is raining (I think)’

Speaker’s assertion does not indicate past experience for a non-experienced situation.

Before detailing the analysis pursued here, it is important to note that the patterns of and generalizations made about the data are limited. Specifically, the data used in this paper come from a single Quechua speaker in a short period of time. This severely limits the external validity of the claims presented here, (i.e. they may not be generalizable to the entire language,

language family, or especially cross-linguistically); nevertheless a cursory review of other descriptions (see Adelaar 1977 and Faller 2002) do seem to coincide with this analysis. It is left for future research to do a more in-depth study of the claims presented here both cross-linguistically and across dialects within the same Quechuan language.

This paper begins by giving a brief overview of evidentiality relying heavily on Aikhenvald (2003 and 2004) and Faller (2002, 2006, and 2007). After this overview, an analysis of the Cuzco Quechua evidentials is given. Lastly, a brief discussion about the implication of this research for the study of evidential systems is provided and a number of future avenues of fruitful research are highlighted.

2. Evidentiality

2.1 The Independence of Evidentiality

There is some debate about the classification of evidentials in semantic terms and there are at least two ways the meaning of evidentiality has been approached. For some (Bhat 1999, Dahl 1985, Palmer 2001, and others), evidentials are a sub-category of possible epistemic moods. This is because both epistemic mood and evidentiality are seen as referring to a speaker's belief or validation of a declaration. Bhat (1999:63), for example, considers epistemic modality to be divided into two categories: judgments and evidence. Judgment refers to whether an utterance "is considered real or unreal and further [if the speaker] is sure or unsure about his own judgment". In Bhat's view evidentials "represent the various bases that a speaker can use for specifying the reality of an event". The two definitions are obviously closely related and are seen as consequently belonging to a single modal category.

The other common view held about evidentials is that they form an independent class which may or may not have correlations with a given language's mood paradigm. Aikhenvald (2002:1)

defines evidentiality as “a grammatical category, referring to an information source” or “stating the existence of a source of evidence for some information; this includes stating that there is some evidence and also specifying what type of evidence there is”. Aikhenvald (2004:3) defines evidentiality as, “a linguistic category whose primary meaning is source of information” which may cover notions of “the way in which the information was acquired, without necessarily relating to the degree of speaker’s certainty concerning the statement or whether it is true or not.” In regards to the semantic description of evidentiality Aikhenvald (2004:7) argues that, “Cross-linguistically, evidentiality, modality (relating to the degree of certainty ‘with which something is said’), and mood (relating to a speech act) are fully distinct categories. In each case, it is important to determine primary meaning for each of these on language-internal grounds.... Evidentiality is a category in its own right, and not a subcategory of any modality, or of tense-aspect.” Similarly, and more specific to Cuzco Quechua, Faller (2002:2) defines evidentiality as “the grammatical encoding of the speaker’s (type of) grounds for making a speech act...for assertions, the speaker’s grounds can be indentified with the speaker’s source of information conveyed by the utterance”. Importantly, for both authors, the independent class of evidentials may have modal “extensions” within a language, but this “depends on the individual system and on the semantics of each individual evidential term”. (Aikhenvald 2004:7).

This paper assumes that the characterization of evidentials as an independent grammatical category is the most empirically adequate because it has the potential for not allowing *a priori* biases to affect the interpretation of the data. That is, when evidentiality is considered to be separate from epistemic modality it does not rule out that it always is distinct, but rather that all things being equal it is assumed first that they are two independent systems. Furthermore, if a close connection with epistemic modality is warranted by the data in a given language, then that

language can be described with evidentiality as part of the epistemic mood system. On the other hand, another language might not show the same amount of correlation between those two grammatical systems. Consequently, this last language can be described without confounding the cross-linguistic semantic interpretations of evidentials in general.

Assuming the independence of evidentials with a possible (close) correlation with epistemic modality allows each system to be described in its own terms, following the language-specific evidence provided. Furthermore, in a language such as Quechua, the two systems (evidentiality and epistemic modality) seem to be mutually exclusive. That is, mood enclitics in Quechua cannot co-occur with each other in a single utterance but mood suffixes and any of the four evidentials can be combined easily (this is discussed at length below in section 5).

Importantly, the semantic perspective of evidentials being assumed here also allows that each language may show differing degrees of correlation between evidentiality and moods, tenses, and aspects. It is, consequently, the responsibility of the linguist to determine how these categories are related (if they are). The requirement that the correlations between each of these grammatical systems be an essential component of a language's description obviously has the potential of allowing for a very chaotic interpretation and description of any of these grammatical categories. This is so because it is not the assumption that these interact in pairs (e.g. only evidentiality and mood, or evidentiality and tense, etc.), but that they are *all* intimately intertwined. For the sake of brevity, however, this paper addresses only the correlation between evidentiality and modality. A more complete description of the system falls outside the timeline for this project and must be left for future work.

2.2 Evidentials

Faller (2002:3) points out that there are perhaps two definitions of evidentiality. The first as stated by Aikhenvald (2002, 2004), and given above, and a second which in addition to indicating the source of information, “marks the speaker’s other attitudes” in relation to the utterance and information (see Chafe 1986)². Faller defines these as narrow and broad descriptions of evidentiality respectively. The discussion in this paper falls somewhere between these two definitions, in that it is assumed that evidentials are used to indicate source of information as well as the speaker’s assumptions about the reality of the event (and consequently reflect their attitudes in some way), this would follow the broad definition. It differs from the broad definition, however, because the analysis does not suggest that the evidentials indicate a speaker’s confidence in the statement or their trust in the source indicated, and consequently is narrower.

The analysis here, specifically, will describe the evidential information in terms of the source of the speaker’s information as either a past *real* experience or a non-past *hypothetical* experience. The proposition of the utterance to which the evidential is applied can be a real or a non-real event (or hypothetical or not) independently of the reality indicated in the evidentials. That is, a given utterance can have mood suffixes marking its *reality* and independently have an evidential marking the *reality* of some other related event.

In commenting on general patterns of epistemic modality, Bhat (1999:65) says that the distinction between *realis* and *irrealis* events is the most important to be made. It should be

² It is not clear how the distinction between a narrow and broad definition of evidentiality is different from the mentioned approach which treats evidentials independently in comparison to the one that subsumes evidentials under the umbrella of epistemic modality. It is, however, apparent that Faller (2002:3) intended to make a distinction in approaches of only the first type. Furthermore, it is believed that this distinction is necessary because it indicates that there is more to the semantics of evidentials than merely source of information.

remembered that for Bhat evidentials are a sub-class of epistemic modality, and consequently may be defined in terms of either realis or irrealis moods. In fact, Bhat (1999: 70) says, “evidentials appear to show a greater number of distinctions in the realis mood (especially in the past tense) than in the irrealis mood”. It is left unclear, however, the way the division between realis and irrealis moods affect the distribution of evidential morphology. This is the main impetus for this paper, to describe the mood interpretations encoded in the evidentials in Cuzco Quechua.

Many sources refer to a typology of evidentiality systems (see Faller 2002, Willet 1988, De Haan 1998, Aikhenvald 2002 and 2004), the discussion here adopts that in Aikhenvald (2004). In this work Aikhenvald claims that evidential systems can be generally classified into types based on the number of evidentials in a language (i.e. a two-term system, a three-term system, etc.). Internal to these types a further subdivision can be made in the semantics of the evidentials (see Aikhenvald 2002: 25 for an overview of the typology of evidentiality). That is, that although language can be classified into types based on their number of members in their evidentiality paradigm, each type is not homogenous; each type can be further divided into distinct types which reflect the finer semantic divisions of evidentials. In these terms Quechua is classified as a three-term system having evidentials which refer to ‘DIRECT EVIDENCE’, ‘HEARSAY/REPORTED’, and ‘INFERENCE’ (see Aikhenvald old, 2004, Faller 2002 and others). Faller (2002) argues that the direct evidential in Quechua should be more correctly labeled as “best possible grounds” (this is discussed in more detail below in section 5.2).

Faller (2002) writes that the Quechua evidentials are semantically defined as having illocutionary meaning, and shows, convincingly, that there is overlap between the epistemic moods and at least one of the evidentials, *-chá* ‘CONJECTURE’. This paper argues that this

overlap is valid also for the concepts of (ir)realis moods. Specifically, it is argued that the evidential system of Cuzco Quechua can be divided into realis evidentials and irrealis evidentials. If the source of information (i.e. the evidence for a proposition) is considered *realis* only DIRECT (Faller's BEST-POSSIBLE GROUNDS) and REPORTED (REP) will be allowed. If the source of information is considered *irrealis* only CONJECTURE (CONJ) and BELIEF will be allowed. This claim is supported by the interactions of the evidentials with the more 'clear' epistemic mood markers (see below).

One important aspect of evidentials usually taken for granted but which is core to the analysis here is the temporal 'location' of the source of information encoded in the various evidentials. Specifically, evidentials are dependent on a time (which hypothetically may or may not be indicated by the speaker) when the source of information was received, gathered, or obtained etc. This location of the source of the information in temporal terms is paramount to the idea of evidentiality. For example, a language using a DIRECT evidential (indicating information gathered from personal experience) can refer only to a time previous to the speaker's utterance when the speaker was a participant in an event which gave them the relevant information. The time span between utterance and reception of the information is not usually relevant; it may be two seconds or it may be twelve years. The point is that the information-gathering happened along a temporal continuum with the information-gathering event either before or after the speaker's utterance but not at the same time. In section 5 it is argued that in Cuzco Quechua the difference between information-gathering events and speaker utterance might best be classified in terms of realis and irrealis events.

2.3 Realis and Irrealis Moods

An important concept being used in the analysis presented in this paper is that between *realis* and *irrealis* moods. These concepts are closely correlated with traditional descriptive terms, such as ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’ used in many European languages. While these notions are, perhaps, relevant to the description of any language, they can form either a core part of a language’s grammar, and be marked grammatically (Chalcatongo Mixtec is one example of a language where mood is a core part of the grammatical system; see Macaulay 1996), or be used in a peripheral way, and be used in conjunction with other grammatical marker (English is one example of language where mood is important but not core to grammatical relations). This paper argues that the distinction between *realis* and *irrealis* moods is essential to an accurate description of the Cuzco Quechua evidentiality paradigm.

Palmer (2001:1), echoing an earlier comment, writes that the most important distinction between in the modality system of any language is between what is “real and unreal or factual and non-factual”. This distinction can, generally, be captured through the use of the mood concepts being discussed. Mithun (1999: 173), for example, defined *realis* as portraying “situations as actualized, as having occurred or actually occurring, knowable through direct perception”. *Irrealis*, in contrast, is defined as portraying, “situations as purely within the realm of thought, knowable only through imagination”. These definitions are assumed to be relevant notions of grammar and when used to describe the evidentiality system of Quechua can indicate the source of information that is ‘real’ and ‘factual’ on the one hand, and source of information that is product of ‘thought’ or the ‘imagination’ on the other.

Palmer (2001: 3-4) adds to these definitions the idea that the distinction between *realis* and *irrealis* is only relevant when an assertion is made. He writes, “[the dichotomy between

realis and irrealis] depends on the distinction between what is asserted and what is not asserted". If this is an accurate description of the uses of these grammatical notions, any grammatical system making use of them would necessarily be based on an assertion/non-assertion continuum. This paper argues that this is just the case in Cuzco Quechua. Evidentiality can be used by a speaker to assert a source of information by the realis evidentials (either *-mi* or *-si*) or a speaker can make use of the irrealis evidentials (either *-chá* or *-chus*) to make a non-assertion *about the source of information*. Crucially the use of evidentials only refers to the source of information and not necessarily to the proposition which they modify (e.g. 'it is raining').

3. Quechua Evidentiality

The evidentials in traditional accounts of Cuzco Quechua are *-mi/-n* (direct personal experience) and *-si/s* (reported information). Clitics that have been considered outside the evidential system (or on its periphery) are *-chá* (conjecture) and *-chus* (belief). This last enclitic never occurs in the data used in this paper without the verbal particle *hina* 'it seems' being placed directly after it (see, for example, Adelaar 1977). All four are exemplified in the sentences in example (3), repeated from (1) and (2) above. It should be noted that in Quechua the evidentials always occur as the last morpheme attached to a root.

(3) Quechua sentences indicating use of evidentials

a. *para-sha-n-mi*

rain-PROG-3SG-DIR

'It is raining'

speaker has seen it raining or has other evidence that it is raining

b. *para-sha-n-si*

rain-PROG-3SG-REP

‘It is reportedly raining’

speaker has received information from someone else

c. *para-sha-n-chá*

rain-PROG-3SG-CONJ

‘It is raining (most likely)’

speaker uses past experience applied to a non-experienced situation

d. *para-sha-n-chus* *hina*

rain-PROG-3SG-BELIEF seems

‘It is raining (I think)’

speaker’s assertion does not indicate past experience for a non-experienced situation

A point that may seem uninteresting, but is nevertheless relevant, is that the use of an evidential implies the perspective of the first person. That is, because of their semantics the first person is the only person able to use the evidentials. It is possible for the speaker to know what s/he personally has experienced, has heard, has deduced, or believes, but it is not possible to know these same things about anyone else. Thus any of the evidentials can be used to indicate different sources of information for the proposition ‘it is raining’ but not ‘you/he think/s it is raining’. This is true for each of these four evidential morphemes. In contrast, the mood enclitics can either be used for all persons or there are separate morphemes with identical

meaning for each grammatical person (e.g. *-waq* ‘2SG.COND’; compare the *-man* ‘1SG.COND’), the evidentials always entail, and only entail, that is the speaker that is commenting on the source of information. This is another argument in favor a four-term system compared to the traditional three-term system because the four evidentials *-n/mi*, *-s/si*, *chá*, and *-chus hina* pattern identically. That is they do not behave like the mood enclitics with separate morphemes for each person and they are mutually exclusive.

4. Quechua Moods

The Cuzco Quechua mood system marks five distinctions. They are the indicative mood, the conditional mood, the dubative mood, certainty mood, and the irrealis mood. The indicative is considered the neutral member in that it does not have any overt morphological marking specific to it, and because when the other mood markers are missing, a sentence is interpreted as being in the indicative mood. The conditional is indicated by use of the suffix *-man*. The dubitative is marked with the suffix *-pas*. Certainty is marked with the suffix *-puni*. The irrealis mood is indicated with the suffix *-chu*. Importantly, in the absence of an overt irrealis marker, all sentences are considered to be realis as defined above. Furthermore the irrealis suffix is mainly used in questions and negative constructions. The sentences in (4) indicate how these moods are used.

(4) Quechua sentences indicating moods

a. *para-sha-n*

rain-PROG-3SG

‘It is raining’ (indicative)

b. *para-sha-n-man*

rain-PROG-3SG-COND

‘If it is raining...’ (conditional)

c. *para-sha-n-puni*

rain-PROG-3SG-CERT

‘It surely is raining’ (certainty)

d. *para-sha-n-chu*

rain-PROG-3SG-IRR

‘Is it raining?’ (irrealis)

e. *para-sha-n-pas-chá*

rain-PROG-3SG-DUB-CONJ

‘It might be raining’ (dubative)

As can be seen from these examples –*puni* is used when the proposition is certain; there is no possible way that the proposition that ‘it is raining’ will not hold. This is in contrast to the suffix –*man* which expresses conditionality in the event or process. That is, the conditional mood indicates that the realization of the proposition uttered is dependent on some other factor, or that some other (subordinate) proposition depends on it. Both the certainty and the conditional moods are used primarily for non-past propositions; the first as a means of expressing certainty in some future or present experience and the latter to express conditionality

in the future or present experience of events. The DUBATIVE mood suffix has the smallest distribution of the moods in the data used here. In fact the only evidential it ever occurs with is the CONJECTURE evidential; it is not clear if this due to the limited data or to the distributional properties of the suffix.

5. Analysis of Modality of Quechua Evidentials

In this section the interaction between the evidential system and their modal interpretations in Quechua is surveyed. For each evidential given in section (3) above, further examples are given and it is shown how these interact with the mood system. It is necessary to reiterate two important distinctions here. First, it is important to note that evidentials may occur with any overt mood marking as given in section (4). This is due to their characterization as an independent grammatical class. Second, that evidentials refer to source of information only. That is, the proposition of the utterance may be in any possible mood (i.e. indicative, conditional, dubative, certainty, or irrealis) and not affect the use of the evidential, and the temporal ‘location’ of the source of information might, independently, be divided into either realis or irrealis events.

5.2 *Direct Evidence (-mi/-n) – Realis*

The DIRECT evidence evidential is used in situation when the speaker has personal knowledge of the proposition in an utterance, or more specifically that they have gained the information encoded in the proposition from personal experience (e.g. seeing, hearing, touching, tasting or doing). This, however, does not always imply that the knowledge is gained from firsthand experience. For example a speaker might also use this evidential when the information is uncontroversial and heard from a witness to the event. Faller (2002), consequently refers to it as the ‘best possible grounds’ marker. Consider the following examples.

(5) Direct Evidence

a. *lima-ta-n* *viaja-n* Faller (2002:19)

lima-OBJ-DIR travel-3SG

‘She travels to in Lima’

speaker was told by her sister

b. *hawa-pi-s* *para-sha-n* Personal Field Notes

outside-LOC-REP rain-PROG-3SG

‘It is raining outside (I’m told)’

speaker was informed by some 2nd hand source

The sentence in (5a) is marked with the *-n* of the direct evidential even though the speaker is not in Lima and did not see or know of the subject of the sentence traveling there. Rather, the speaker is able to make this statement with this DIRECT evidential because someone else who witnessed the subject’s travel to Lima (or was witness to the consequence of travel) has informed him. Consequently, the source of information is considered ‘real’ (i.e. not hypothetical) and uncontroversial. In the sentence in (5b) the reported evidential is used to indicate that the information was gathered from a second hand source and there is no indication if that source was witness to the event or not. The source of information in (5b) is consequently one which cannot be considered uncontroversial. It is based on utterances like those in (5) that Faller (2002) refers to the DIRECT evidential as BEST-POSSIBLE GROUNDS. The argument is convincing, but the traditional designation of the evidential has been used throughout this paper in order to avoid

confusion for cross-linguistic comparability. The sentences in (6) further exemplify the use of this morpheme.

(6) Direct Evidential

a. *pay-mi yana-y*

he/she-DIR wife-1SG.POSS

‘She is my wife’

b. *pay yacha-n-mi ri-sqa-ta*

he/she know-3SG-DIR go-PST.NOM-OBJ

‘He knows the way’

c. *mana-n rit'i-sha-n-chu*

not-DIR snow-PROG-3SG-IRR/NEG

‘It is not snowing’

d. *kay tapara-wan-qa yacha-saq-mi*

this book-COM-FOC know-1SG.FUT-DIR

‘I will learn from this book’

speaker knows personal abilities

It can be seen that this evidential can refer to a past-time event when the information was received by the speaker. Furthermore, and almost uninterestingly, this past-time event is seen as

‘real’ since it was a fact of the speaker’s life, and thus indicates a *realis* event. Again, this is not to say that the evidential cannot occur in conjunction with a proposition in an irrealis mood, but only that information gathering event is *realis*. To see how this evidential interacts with the Quechua moods, examples (except dubative) are given in (7).

(7) Direct Evidential and Mood

a. *para-n-puni-n*

rain-3SG-CERT-DIR

‘It is certainly/always raining’

b. *haqay-pi-puni-n saya-n autobús*

there-LOC-CERT-DIR stop-3SG bus

‘The bus always stops over there’.

c. *para-pi puri-spa-qa unqu-ru-y-man-mi*

rain-LOC walk-PRES.NOM-FOC sick-PERF-1SG-COND-DIR

‘Walking in the rain I might get sick’

d. *para-sha-n-man-mi*

rain-PROG-3SG-COND-DIR

‘If it rains...’

Only two of the four non-indicative moods are given here because of missing information, but it is assumed based on the analysis here that additional data would not alter the relevant patterns. In (7a) the proposition is considered certain or inevitable and it is thus marked with *-puni*; likewise the existence of the source of information is considered factual being based on first-hand knowledge. The other sentences indicate similar things; that the evidential only refers to the reality of the event where information was gathered but implies nothing about the proposition itself. Consequently the *-mi* evidential is seen as denoting a past-time event when the information was gathered; a *realis* event.

3.2 Reported (-si/-s) - Realis

This evidential indicates that the information was received through another person or other people. It might be termed HEARSAY, but because this can have a connotation of mistrust or untruth in English, which this evidential does not display, it is believed that REPORTED is a better description. The REPORTED evidential simply means that the speaker's evidence is not his own, or rather that the event where information was gathered was not his own experience. It might be that the speaker mistrusts the information, but this does not form a necessary part of the semantics of this enclitic. Examples of this suffix are given in (8).

(8) Reported Evidential

a. *alli-n-si ka-sha-n ñan*

good-3SG-REP be-PROG-3SG road

The road is good, they say

b. *ni-wa-nku yawra-sha-n-si*

say-1OBJ-3SG burn-PROG-3SG-REP

‘They tell me it is burning’ (speaker about a specific object)

c. *ni-wa-nku para-s chaya-nqa*

say-1OBJ-3SG rain-REP fall-3FUT

‘They tell me it will rain’

d. *turu-q hawa-m-pi-s tiyay-ku-n*

bull-GEN on.top-3SG-LOC-REP sit-REFL-3SG

‘It is placed on the bull’s back, it said’ this is from a text on bullfighting.

e. *ni-n-mi para-sha-n-si*

say-3SG-DIR rain-PROG-3SG-REP

‘They told me it is raining’

As with the DIRECT evidence evidential, the REPORTED evidential refers to information gathered in a past-time event, which may be applied to propositions in any tense (past, present, or future) or mood. Consequently, this evidential also can refer to a *realis* event; something that is not in the realm of thought but actually happening or happened. In contrast, however, the reality of the information-gathering event is seen as less real than with the DIRECT evidential. The example in (8e) is especially interesting because it makes use of both the direct and the reported evidential. In this example the act of being told is experienced first-hand but the event of raining is still second-hand information, and both potentially indicate *realis* events: the event of raining, and the event of being told about the raining; both refer to a past-time that can

indicate real world events. The examples in (9) exemplify the way this evidential interacts with Quechua modality.

(9) Reported Evidential and Mood

a. *para-n-puni-s*

rain-3SG-CERT-REP

‘It is said it surely/always rains’

b. *mixu-n-puni-s*

eat-3SG-CERT-REP

‘He surely/always eats’, ‘ he is a glutton’

3.3 Conjecture/Inference (-chá) – *Irrealis*

The CONJECTURE evidential indicates that the source of information of a proposition is based on a speaker’s conjecture or reasoning. That is, a speaker gains evidence for a proposition based on their mental faculties and past experiences. Specifically, this evidential means that the source of information for a proposition is based on other similar, but past, experiences, and therefore is likely to be valid, but it is not sure whether those past experiences are relevant for the present proposition; there is a chance for the past experience not to be relevant. This evidential is exemplified in (10).

(10) Conjecture Evidential

a. *ni-saq-chá*

say-1sg.FUT-CONJ

‘I will say’

b. *pi-chá hamu-ra-n wasi-y-man*

who-CONJ come-PST-3SG house-1SG.POSS-DAT

‘Someone came to my house’

c. *riku-ru-ni ima-chá*

see-PERF-1SG what-CONJ

‘I saw something’

d. *khumpa-y mixu-sha-n-raq-chá kinsa pacha-pi*

friend-1SG.POSS eat-PROG-3SG-STILL-CONJ three hour-LOC

‘My friend will still be eating at 3 o’clock.’

e. *pay ri-nqa-chá qhatu-man*

he go-3.FUT-CONJ store-DAT

‘He will go to the store’

This is the only evidential in the data used here that can occur with the DUBATIVE mood marker *-pas*. It is not clear why this should be the case, but it is believed that it has something to

do with the uncertain (i.e. irrealis) nature of the source of information and its consequences on the proposition. That is, since the source of information is uncertain, the actuality of the event in the proposition is also questioned. This might argue that the more *irrealis* the evidential is, the more it will affect the reality of the proposition of the utterance. This is another avenue open for further research. The examples in (11) show that this evidential can also be used with any mood marker.

(11) Conjecture Evidential and Mood

a. *para-sha-n-puni-chá*

rain-PROG-3SG-CERT-CONJ

‘It surely/always is raining’

b. *mixu-sha-n-man-chá*

eat-PROG-3SG-COND-CONJ

‘If he eats...’

It should be noted here that my Quechua informant said this last sentence was possible and grammatical but that he would prefer not to use this combination of morphemes.

c. *taki-saq-pas-chá*

sing-1SG.FUT-DUB-CONJ

‘I will/may sing’

Following from the semantics of this evidential it is clear that the source of information, but not necessarily the proposition itself, is considered *irrealis*, or in the realm of possibility without factual basis. Furthermore, as Faller (2002) points out, this evidential overlaps with the epistemic modality system and consequently affects the proposition as well. This intertwining of modality and evidentiality is a consequence of the language specific system and not some typological generalization of irrealis evidentials. It is expected that in other languages irrealis evidentials may not affect the proposition and be isolated to the source of information.

3.4 *Belief (-chus) – Irrealis*

This suffix is the only one used in the present analysis that is not traditionally considered to be part of the evidential system. It is therefore one hypothesis of this paper that it should be included in this grammatical category and consequently move the Quechua system from a three-term system to a four-term system. Aikhenvald (2004:51) indicates that within the language with a four-term evidential system the fourth term can have meanings along the lines of “inferred, reported, assumed, quotative, or non-visual sensory”. It is argued that the semantics of this evidential in Quechua fit into this typological claim though refining it slightly. Specifically, Cuzco Quechua can be classified, following Aikhenvald (2004:51), as having what is called a C2 evidential system: this type of system has evidentials referring to DIRECT, REPORTED, INFERRED, and ASSUMED source of information. In the case of the Quechua the ASSUMED evidential is best classified as BELIEF.

This suffix is used to indicate that the source of information is not based on some past experience but on the ‘beliefs’ or ‘opinions’ of the speaker. That is, this suffix can be used only when a speaker believes a proposition is valid (or will be valid) but that there has not been an

information gathering event confirming the proposition (which would warrant the other evidentials).³

Historically, the BELIEF suffix might be a combination of *-chu* + *-s* ‘irrealis + reported’ with the meaning it is ‘reportedly questioned’ or ‘I think’. It is quite possible that this may have been the source for the historical development of this suffix but because there is no data indicating that it is possible to divide this suffix into these two parts it is assumed that it no longer has that function. Instead it is seen as functioning as a single suffix meaning ‘belief’⁴. The sentences in (12) exemplify this evidential.

(12) Belief Evidential

a. *mixu-saq-chus* *hina*
eat-1SG.FUT-BELIEF seems
‘I think I am going to eat’

b. *para-sha-n-chus* *hina*
rain-PROG-3SG-BELIEF seems
‘I think it is raining’

³ In other dialects of Cuzco Quechua (see Faller 2002) the verb *hina* is not a required part of constructions using this suffix, and therefore this dialect shows differences from other varieties of the language.

⁴ There is some indication that there is a suffix *-chun* which might indicate that the evidential can be divided from the irrealis mood marker, but it is not clear about this suffix’s use and distribution. If it turns out to be a valid morpheme, this may be an example of the irrealis mood marker being using with the realis evidential markers. In that case the analysis here will necessarily need revision.

c. *urma-y-ru-nqa-chus* *hina* *kay botella*

fall-INF-PERF-3FUT-BELIEF seems this bottle

‘I think this bottle is going to fall’

Like the other evidentials presented above this suffix can also be used with propositions with different moods. This can be seen in the examples in (13).

(13) Belief Evidential and Mood

a. *para-sha-n-puni-chus* *hina*

rain-PROG-3SG-CERT-BELIEF seems

‘I think it is surely/always be raining’

b. *para-sha-n-man-chus* *hina*

rain-PROG-3SG-COND-BELIEF seems

‘If I think it is raining....’

It can be seen that this evidential marks an *irrealis* source of information. That is, the source of information for the proposition is not known to be factual. Similar to the CONJECTURE evidential discussed above this suffix overlaps with the epistemic modality system. This means that with this suffix the source of information is considered irrealis and the proposition is seen as potentially holding but that there is no concrete evidence for its validity.

6. Discussion and Conclusion


Studies concerning evidential systems are relatively young because it was only recently that source of information was described as its own grammatical category (see Aikhenvald 2004). The uniqueness of evidentiality has led many linguists to postulate a category that is either isolated from closely related grammatical categories (like aspect and mood) or marginally to comment on the correlation between these different grammatical classes. This paper, however, has shown that it is essential to understand the interrelated nature of evidentiality, mood, tense, and aspect. In fact, the Cuzco Quechua evidential paradigm cannot be accurately described without recognizing these relationships.

The argument presented in the paper is that traditional descriptions of the Cuzco Quechua evidential system do not account for the modal entailments of these morphemes, specifically with the notions of *realis* and *irrealis* modalities. When seen purely as a marker of the source of information, Cuzco Quechua shows a four-term paradigm with two terms potentially indicating *realis* mood and two terms indicating *irrealis* mood. This analysis has some implications for research into both Quechua and evidentiality in general.

The patterns exemplified in the body of this paper argue for a clear division between the ways the source of information concerning a given proposition can be organized. Of the four possible ways to indicate source of information (or evidentiality) two are *realis* meaning that they are sources that are thought to have been in the past-time and to have actually existed (to have been real). The two *realis* evidentials are the DIRECT and the REPORTED evidentials, *-mi/-n* and *-si/-s* respectively. The other possibility is that the source of information is thought of as being less real and more existent on the plane of thought as conjecture or belief. There are, similarly, two evidentials which fall into this category, the CONJECTURE and the BELIEF

evidentials, *-chá* and *-chus*. respectively This gives an utterance a possibility of two modalities, the first for the proposition itself and indicated by one the traditional markers of epistemic mood, and the second for the information encoded in the evidential.

The observant reader will have noticed that each term within the two groups of evidentials are not homogenous. That is, there seem to be both characteristics that group them and characteristics that divide them within an evidential mood type; both terms in a given class have significant differences as well as showing one significant similarity. This argues that there is a finer organization to be discovered. This organization and the apparent differences between the two terms in a class is understandable if the reality of the source of information is considered to be a continuum with absolutely ‘real’ on one side and ‘possibly real’ on the other. The realis evidentials group more closely on the realis (absolutely real) side of the continuum and the irrealis evidentials group more closely on the irrealis (possibly real) side of the continuum. This can be illustrated in Figure 1.



This illustration and the discussion throughout this paper argue that as the source of information is seen as more ‘real’ from the perspective of the speaker the more likely they are to use the DIRECT evidential. As the reality of the source of information, or as Palmer (2001) worded it, the assertion value of the source of information, become less ‘real’, the more likely it is that the speaker will make use of the *irrealis* evidentials.

This analysis of the evidential system has the added benefit of accounting for the optionality of the presence of the realis evidentials (especially the direct evidential). If a proposition is seen

as fact and therefore realis it would be redundant to include this information in the form of the evidential, especially if it is assumed that a speaker's assertions and declarations are factual according to his experiences. As the proposition becomes less real and exists more only in the realm of possibility or of thought it becomes increasingly necessary to indicate that the source of information is also less real through the use of the irrealis evidentials. Thus the Cuzco Quechua evidential system is grammatically required in direct proportion with the unreality of the event and is grammatical optional in relation to the amount of grammatical redundancy encoded in the evidential. Interestingly this might also explain why there seems to be some overlap between the required irrealis evidentials and the general epistemic mood of the proposition.

As mentioned, the generalizations and distributional patterns discussed in this paper have only a limited amount of validity. Further research will need to focus on more speakers, dialects, and languages to validate the claims made here and to make them more generalizable cross-linguistically. Furthermore this paper has argued that Quechua evidential system is intimately related with the notion of mood but almost nothing has been said about its relationship to tense or aspect. Future studies will need to broaden the perspective taken here and show how all of these systems interact. It is expected that as these avenues of research are explored research into Quechua evidentials and evidentials in general will progress, refining many hypotheses and finding evidence in support of others.

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